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Abstract.  During their long exile during 1940-1944, various components of the “Free French” were 
largely kept out of the “Post-War Planning” process that took place in the American State Department. 
They perceived this absence as a major, and often deliberate, humiliation that made the circumstances 
of their exile all the more exasperating. Charles de Gaulle was seen by the “Anglo-Saxon” Allies as 
a figure of dubious worth and usefulness, and Washington’s general tone was to dismiss the exiles as 
the “so-called Free French”. They were admitted to the decision-making process only slowly and 
grudgingly, and not until after many of the key decisions about organising the United Nations had 
been taken. This article shows how that exclusion affected the French leadership, how they reacted, 
and suggests some lasting results. It also assesses to what extent France had a coherent contribution 
to the formation of a global international organisation during 1943-1944, and what factors inhibited 
France properly articulating that contribution. 
 
 
 
The literature on the creation of the United Nations [UN] in the last two years of the Second World 
War, especially the initial conference at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, DC between 21 August and 
7 October 1944 and that at San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945, is copious.1  Maybe 
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understandably, the contribution of France tends to be neglected in favour of discussions of the 
attitudes of the Big Three – Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.  France’s defeat in 1940 
meant that the official French “Vichy” state was dominated by a German occupation until summer 
1944 and was seen as a hostile factor by the Allies. The Allies remaining in the fight were already 
calling themselves the “United Nations” after the name was first adopted on 29 December 1941 at 
the White House conference between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and American 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.2 No role was initially envisaged for a France still tainted in 
1941 by the stain of collaboration with the enemy. And a France that aspired to full independence 
was not represented at a 26-nation conference on 1 January 1942 in Washington attended by 
Churchill, Roosevelt, Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet foreign minister, and T.V. Soong, the Nationalist 
Chinese foreign minister.  Amongst European states occupied by the Nazis even Belgium, 
Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Netherlands, and Poland were represented.3 
For many in the emerging French Resistance, which contained many strains of opinion, this 
neglect created a feeling of hurt pride that only added to an existing sense of despair and humiliation 
over the events of 1940. From the perspective of the Big Three, the military state of the war and the 
greatly changed and diminished importance of France as a major Power in international politics 
clearly played a determinate role in France’s exclusion from the top table. But other factors were at 
work. One clear reason for the exclusion was that Roosevelt admired France, and especially those 
fighting within the French Resistance, but harboured a not unreasonable distrust of General Charles 
De Gaulle, the self–proclaimed and generally acknowledged leader of the Free French. Many French 
exiles and résistants also feared De Gaulle’s Napoleonic or “Boulangist” traits: was he merely just 
another French general set on total power?  
 De Gaulle’s relationship with both Churchill and Roosevelt was fractious. Churchill tended 
to protect him against Roosevelt, who was annoyed from the beginning of his acquaintance with the 
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general after De Gaulle ordered Free French marines to re-take the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon 
off the coast of Canada from Vichy forces in 1941 without telling the authorities in London or 
Washington, or even those in Ottawa.4 Roosevelt initially wanted to send an American battleship to 
remove the upstarts until persuaded against doing so by the Canadian government.5 After that there 
was little love lost between De Gaulle and Roosevelt’s Administration. De Gaulle was not by any 
means the favoured candidate of the Anglo-Saxon Allies for any future leadership of France. Only 
Churchill both loved France and, most of the time, admired De Gaulle. 6  
 The France represented by the Free French was admitted to the decision-making process only 
slowly and grudgingly, and not until after many of the key decisions about the organisation of the UN 
had been taken.  This analysis shows how that exclusion affected the French leadership, how it 
reacted, and suggests some lasting results. It also demonstrates to what extent France had a coherent 
contribution to make to the formation of a global international organisation during 1943-1944, and 
what factors inhibited France properly articulating that contribution. 
The great “Anglo-Saxon” Powers, Britain and the United States, have had an ambiguous 
relationship with France throughout their mutual history. The Anglo-French case has frequently been 
punctuated by war as well as by alliance. Robert and Isabel Tombs have summed that up by quoting 
Philip Sydney’s sobriquet, “that sweet enemy, France”.7 However it is undeniable that all three 
Powers played key roles in defining what the “West” would and should be and, amongst them, they 
were instrumental in forging the main theories and practices of international relations for a good part 
of the last 100 years. Sometimes this has led to what might be called “progressive” or even “liberal” 
thinking; sometimes it has led to massive divergence of thinking.8  
The creation of international organisations is one of the greatest “liberal” ideas in international 
relations. France played an important role in setting up the League of Nations after 1918, especially 
through the initiatory role before and during the First World War of Senator Léon Bourgeois. This 
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influence continued through to the 1930s, led by French foreign minister – and on occasion premier 
– Aristide Briand. 9  Broadly speaking, French thinkers and politicians believed international 
organisations should build on the early twentieth century tradition of bi- and multi-lateral legal 
agreements to limit armaments and enshrine the necessity for peace in globally-binding documents, 
of which the Franco-American Kellogg-Briand pact to outlaw war in 1928 was the crowning glory. 
These declarations and the legalistic spirit that inspired them never much impressed the Anglo-Saxon 
governments in London and Washington, even if some prominent British and American input 
smoothed their passage in the League.10   
 But by the early 1930s many in France, especially on the right, had come to doubt that what 
Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu called the “plate-forme de Genève”, where the League was based; 
it had produced nothing more than a “République des mots” and, moreover, one where France’s 
interests were routinely flouted and traduced, not least by French politicians like Briand. So, for 
example, the prolonged agony of the League’s Disarmament Conferences from 1925 to 1934 had led 
to scant rewards for France’s security needs. The main beneficiaries of this neglect were said to be 
mainly the “Anglo-Saxon” Powers, Britain and the United States, as well as Germany. France was 
portrayed as being outflanked and outgunned in the battle of ideas and in international politics more 
broadly.11 So the idea of what international organisations should aim to achieve was already one 
where France felt both a strong sense of co-ownership, and also one of having been stripped of that 
by the “Anglo-Saxons” well before the subject of a next generation of international organisations 
arose as a result of the Second World War. When Roosevelt proclaimed a renewed vision of 
international organisations as part of his “New World Order” and had that elaborated as part of the 
largely Anglo-American process known as “Post-War Planning” after 1941, France’s voice was 
conspicuously absent in both official meetings and as part of the Post-War Planning process. 
Arguably other exiled governments that had had the good sense to establish themselves in Washington 
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– rather than London or Algiers as did the Free French – had the ear of the post-war planners more 
than did the Free French.  
 After the initial hesitant and largely symbolic steps of late 1941and early 1942, the Moscow 
Declaration of October 1943 had led to a Four-Nation Declaration – Britain, China, the United States, 
and Soviet Union – establishing a “general organization for the maintenance of peace and security”. 
When the process of European liberation began, the tripartite British, American, and Soviet European 
Advisory Commission [EAC[ was set up, as well as bodies like the Advisory Council for Italy. A 
Tripartite Commission resulted in an early decision to co-ordinate relief work through the “United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration” [UNRRA], led by Roosevelt’s close associate and 
former Governor of New York, Herbert Lehman,12 after a ceremony in the White House in early 
November 1943.13  Early discussions of membership did not give France an immediate right to 
membership whilst it was still occupied by the Germans, and certainly not a right to sit in the highest 
fora of decision-making about the form the UN might take. 
 Even if by mid-1944 France’s position had been marginally enhanced in Roosevelt’s eyes by 
an inevitably minor contribution to the war effort, it was by no means certain that the visceral hostility 
felt by Roosevelt towards De Gaulle was surmountable. The French were not invited to send a 
delegation to the initial Dumbarton Oaks Conference of July-August 1944, which planned the basis 
of what became the UN.  A pre-war French foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, gave short shrift to the 
subject in his semi-official history of the French Foreign Ministry, Le Quai d’Orsay sous trois 
républiques. He merely recounted that before the subsequent conference in San Francisco in April 
1945, “the French Government intended to freely discuss decisions already made without it, notably 
at Dumbarton Oaks”.14 A former Quai d’Orsay official, René Massigli, a very prominent diplomat 
before the war and based in London from 1941 and 1944 as De Gaulle’s eyes and ears, would 
normally have been expected to be given access to the highest table of discussions about any future 
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international organisation. He had been the main Quai official concerned with the Kellogg-Briand 
pact and more generally the key French official at the League in the early 1930s, rising to become 
deputy political director of the Quai. After being dismissed by the Vichy Government in 1940, 
Massigli became De Gaulle’s commissioner for Foreign Affairs – commissaire aux Affaires 
étrangères – the effective Free French foreign minister from early 1943 until he was given the post 
of ambassador at London by De Gaulle in August 1944.15 
But, even as De Gaulle’s ambassador to London, Massigli recorded that the closest he got to 
the Dumbarton Oaks discussions was to be entertained at a dinner at the Foreign Office in London in 
late August 1944 with the foreign secretary’s, Anthony Eden’s, jokes about Stalin. He was also 
briefed about the broad thrust of the proposals – a Security Council, an Assembly, probably a 
permanent site, “the question has not been decided upon” [la question demeure ouverte]. Extensive 
notes were taken by various members of the French hierarchy in exile in Washington, which shows 
that they were very aware of what was being planned, but they were not formally consulted about 
what they thought of such ideas at the time of Dumbarton Oaks. And none of the notes, other than 
those by Massigli, remaining as French ambassador at London until 1954, indicate a 
contemporaneous account: they are dated to much later in 1944.16 One obvious reason for this fact is 
that the reconstituted Quai d’Orsay was not properly established in Paris until December 1944, and 
it is from that date that the first official papers on international conferences can be found.17  
 A key question has to be why representatives of the Free French had so little influence in 
Washington? De Gaulle’s maybe laudable but mistaken decision was to base Free French decision-
making as close as possible to the fighting and to France, thus in London or Algiers. First contacts 
between the American State Department and the Free French occurred in early 1941 in Brazzaville 
in French Equatorial Africa. De Gaulle had sent a trusted group of aides there in August 1940 to 
foment revolt against Vichy, including René Pleven, a pre-war industrialist who had worked in the 
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United States. As has been pointed out by Jean Lacouture, “At that time of course De Gaulle had no 
notion of decolonization”, and De Gaulle wanted in any case to make the point that the French Empire 
was a key element in France’s future resurrection as a Great Power.  Churchill had also given his 
support to an African base, and the result was most satisfying, as most of French Equatorial Africa 
rallied to Free France in “Three Glorious Days”, 26-28 August 1940.18 However, the choice of a 
distinctly colonial base was bound to irritate both Roosevelt and most of the State Department, which 
was distinctly anti-colonial. In his first communications with the State Department, through the 
British Embassy in Washington as he had no other direct system, De Gaulle asked the British to make 
it very clear that they recognise the “Conseil de Défense de l’Empire”. Importantly, De Gaulle was 
in no way claiming that his forces represented “un Gouvernement française indépendant”. The 
clumsy formulation of the Conseil de Défense de l’Empire was intended to show the American 
authorities that he was not claiming to be the French government-in-exile – so persuading the 
Americans that he could safely be given minimal recognition – whilst simultaneously reminding 
Washington that he based his authority on a colonial reality that the Americans abhorred.19 This 
dialogue of the deaf was never really overcome through to the end of the war, and indeed beyond it. 
 But there were also Free French representatives based in Washington throughout most of the 
war. The initial main point of contact between the emerging Free French and the State Department 
was Pleven, who was held in some evident personal esteem in both the State Department and in the 
Foreign Office and went to Washington in June 1941. Nonetheless, Pleven worried that his arrival 
might upset “certain high ranking Americans”.20 The last French government before the surrender of 
1940 had given him the thankless task of trying to increase French aircraft production in 1939 – under 
the last French air minister, Guy La Chambre.21  Pleven knew Eden well enough to ask him to 
ascertain in May 1941, before going to the United States, what he thought was American policy 
towards Vichy and the Free French. Eden expressed his dismay to Pleven that the Americans were 
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sending oil and other commodities to French colonies in North Africa, which clearly could be used 
by the Axis.22 Despite the Free French and initially attempting to be even-handed towards Vichy 
through his ambassador, Admiral William Leahy, Roosevelt grappled with “which France” needed to 
be recognised. William L. Langer called this Roosevelt’s “Vichy gamble”, and it was greatly resented 
at the time and after by De Gaulle.23   
 This problem was exacerbated by infighting about who should represent the Free French in 
Washington. The French community in the United States in 1941-1942 was made up of many 
different factions, some openly sympathetic to Vichy, and by no means all of those who opposed 
Vichy supported De Gaulle. The analogous problem for Roosevelt was that several key French 
political figures “rallied” to De Gaulle, whilst others were distrusted by De Gaulle or distrusted him. 
One such reluctant recruit was the former Third Republic radical-socialist politician, Pierre Cot, now 
exiled in the United States.  He offered his services to De Gaulle through Pleven and was rebuffed. 
De Gaulle’s lack of belief in democratic politics particularly irked Cot, although he still believed only 
De Gaulle could lead France.24  
 But the choice of Pleven as representative in Washington did not meet the approval of other, 
even Gaullist, French exiles such as Jacques Maritain, an American-based French academic, who 
thought he was not able to speak adequately for the “whole movement”. What they all agreed on was 
the increasingly vital task of trying to influence the American Post-War Planning process.  René 
Cassin and Maurice Dejean, two De Gaulle loyalists, tried to be more encouraging than Pleven about 
the state of affairs, but even they agreed that “the Americans are either unenthusiastic or know nothing 
about us” [peu favorables ou nous ignorent].25 Pleven stayed on for quite awhile as De Gaulle’s 
representative in Washington. However, later in 1941, a report for De Gaulle from another veteran 
Quai diplomat, Hervé Alphand, showed that Pleven never managed to quell the feeling in official 
American circles that the Free French attracted “une sympathie certaine”.  Sumner Welles, a senior 
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State Department official close to Roosevelt, still believed that “France, for us, is Pétain [the Vichy 
leader], Weygand [a Vichy collaborationist later imprisoned by the Germans] and De Gaulle”. Pleven 
reported that when he met Welles in October 1941, “M. Welles est toujours très froid”. Pleven was 
replaced by Adrien Tixier, an anti-Vichy politician, not long afterwards; in turn, Henri Hoppenot, a 
former diplomat, replaced Tixier in 1943.26  
 After Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into the war, Free French-American 
relations should have improved, but did not noticeably. One reason was the continuing suspicion of 
and antipathy for De Gaulle, which has been well-documented. But a subsidiary and just as important 
corollary was the way French representatives often reported in less than favourable terms on the 
content of emerging American or Anglo-American initiatives for the future world order and of 
international organisations in particular. Details about Post-War Planning emerged only very slowly. 
As late as April 1943 a “Note” from the Free French office in Washington agreed with the Sunday 
Star journalist, Constantine Brown, that so far no system had been developed by the State Department 
to “synchronise” American planning with that of the other Allies. Brown dismissed the Anglo-
American Atlantic Charter of 1941 “as a document expressing in a vague style theories and ideals 
which are even more vague”. Barner Nover in the Washington Post was reported as saying in an 
article, “Beyond the Atlantic Charter”, until the United States adopted “a precise policy about the 
organization of the peace, the Allies had no other choice than to await on events” [rester dans 
l’expectative]. He also reminded his readers that these Allies were also worried about another “volte-
face” like that of 1919. 27  
 It was of course not true that no Post-War Planning had yet taken place, although the main 
committee set up under the overall jurisdiction of Welles only started work in early 1942. But in the 
febrile atmosphere of Washington at that period, it was easy for the French in particular to feel they 
were being left out of the discussions, especially given Welles’ well-known antipathy towards De 
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Gaulle. His dismissal of the French in London and later Algiers – admittedly in early 1941 – as the 
“so-called Free French” gave great offense and even outraged some members of the Post-War 
Planning process like Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle.28 But it was definitely the case that 
Welles reflected Roosevelt’s feelings about De Gaulle and the Free French. Even as late as August 
1943, Time magazine reported that there had only been “rumors” that the Allies “would give some 
sort of recognition to the French Committee of National Liberation”. Again there were accusations 
of disunity amongst the Free French leadership. In a bout of black humour, a prominent French 
official, André Philip, was reported in The Nation as suggesting that the Free French should question 
whether “with certainty . . . there was a United States of America”, whilst asking that the State 
Department “should be told to achieve unity among its own leaders before applying for any 
recognition [by the French]”.29  
 The Free French did take steps to counter these accusations of disunity. Hoppenot reported on 
American politics and other matters of interest to the Free French and seems to have been given fairly 
open access to the State Department. However, there is some justification for the complaints of the 
Free French hierarchy, and later after 3 June 1944 of the French Provisional Government – 
gouvernement provisoire de la République française [GPRF] – that they were being kept informed 
about many major developments in Post-War Planning by State Department press releases. Moreover, 
Cordell Hull, Roosevelt’s secretary of state, informed the French government-in-exile on 17 July 
1944 that only representatives of the Big Three would meet at Dumbarton Oaks, and that the Chinese 
and “other” governments would later be informed of progress. The State Department than gave 
Hoppenot what he qualified as “evasive replies” as to which governments, although “in principle 
there would be a place for the French”. But it was made clear this would only be once France had a 
“Government freely chosen by the French people”.30 
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 Bonnet was nonetheless not entirely correct in implying that French representatives had not 
been consulted about Dumbarton Oaks, nor that the Free French government had no influence over 
the discussions about the future of international organisations in the broad sense of the term. Pierre 
Mendès France, another of De Gaulle’s then close allies in the United States, attended much of the 
Bretton Woods discussions on the future of economic international organisations. But to unpack 
exactly how much influence the French had over the future of post-war international organisations is 
not entirely straightforward. To do so requires an analysis of the views of France held, especially, by 
American officials at every level including the president, but also by politicians in London. It also 
requires an analysis of what the involved French officials thought should be discussed and why. 
 In 1944-1945, Free French officials were generally despondent about the loss of European 
influence in the world. In the first general file from after the Liberation, an anonymous summary 
muses that whilst Europe and Western “civilisation” were not quite “decadent”, a term taken from 
Arnold Toynbee’s oft-quoted writings, the very idea of them was now “morally ambiguous”. Europe 
had certainly lost its sense of being “pre-eminent”. Europe’s fate was now being decided by three 
“non-European Powers” [sic], the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Insofar as this affected 
international organisations, and the UN in particular, the cause was clear: the United States did not 
want to repeat the mistakes of the last war, which meant that this time questions of international 
organisations had to be settled before the war ended. All decisions about this planning had been made 
by the Big Three, behind closed doors, from 1941 onwards. In turn, international organisations were 
linked to the Big Three’s obsession with “spheres of influence” that had been decided by the Russians 
and the “English” at Moscow in October 1944 – Churchill and Stalin’s so-called “percentages 
agreement”. The United States that was mainly accused of “blame” for this state of affairs with its 
practice of “covering up realist bargains with the rhetoric of high principle” [couvrir de grands 
principes des marchandages réalistes imposes par la situation]. This the way that nineteenth century 
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diplomats like Talleyrand or Castlereagh would have done it; but the result was that “there were no 
more bases, no more common principles upon which international society was to be [hereafter] 
based”.31  
 The general feeling amongst the Free French in this period can therefore be summed up as 
being that encapsulated in the plaintive appeal of the title of this analysis: “If France is no longer of 
any importance to you, we would like to be told”.32 These particular words were addressed to Britain’s 
deputy prime minister and Labour Party leader, Clement Attlee, and his Party by the prominent 
French socialist, Vincent Auriol, in July 1944. It is a fair reflection of much of French feeling about 
their relationship with the British and American governments before D-Day, during much of the 
darkest period of the Second World War, and for a good few years to come.  
 However, the subsequent establishment of the GPRF on 3 June 1944 and then of the Fourth 
Republic (1946-1958) owed most to the residual prestige of France, inextricably linked to the 
personality of De Gaulle. The full integration of France into international society would have to wait 
for the election of a proper French government or, as a document by Hoppenot from Washington of 
November 1944 summed it up, “all in good time” [variously “en temps voulu” and “le moment 
venu”].33   
 The Free French believed then, and many French officials continued to believe well into the 
post-war period, that Roosevelt and the State Department’s personal dislike of De Gaulle had 
motivated some very perverse policy decisions in Washington. Was that not why Leahy had 
developed rather friendly relations with Pétain, asked Hoppenot in January 1945 as he left his post in 
the United States? Hoppenot’s assessment of Roosevelt was even more brutally frank in his last 
despatch to Paris: he was “vieilli, instable, superficiel, de plus en plus dépendant d’un entourage qui 
ne nous est pas favorable” [an old, unstable and superficial man increasingly dependent on a group 
of officials which is not favourable to us]. This was despite Roosevelt in his farewell meeting with 
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Hoppenot giving a very favourable report of De Gaulle’s meeting with Stalin in late 1944 and greeting 
the ambassador with his “habitual cordiality” [avec sa cordialité habituelle].34 To be fair to Roosevelt, 
he had been advised in 1943 by Robert Murphy, American chargé d’affaires in Vichy, not to over-
antagonise Vichy so as to help with American plans to invade North Africa – Operation Torch.35 But 
the Free French were not informed of these plans and would not have approved of them if they had. 
 The French were also not entirely excluded from the emerging plans for international 
organisations. Pleven received information in early 1944 of the existence a number of meetings about 
the “[Harry Dexter] White Plan” that eventually became the basis of the Bretton Woods Agreements 
– White was a senior American Treasury official. Mendès France was given a much more positive 
role as the French delegate at Bretton Woods in July and informed of the underlying “Anglo-Saxon” 
rationale for future international economic co-operation. This awoke French fears of economic 
dominance by the United States and, in particular, triggered an obsession about the future value of 
the French franc, a subject that seems to have summed up all their justified fears of a future pound 
sterling and, especially, American dollar domination of the post-war financial system. They also 
feared being given a minor role in the new International Monetary Fund and World Bank as France 
would have just 4.8 percent of the votes, well behind Britain and Canada. Even China, which French 
politicians treated with disdain, was to get 5.8 percent and the United States 28 percent. The various 
versions of the “White” and “Keynes” plans – the latter a British proposal for an international 
currency union – were not discussed with the Free French until the final “Common Declaration” of 
21 April 1944, to which “aucun expert français n’y avait donné son adhesion [no French official had 
agreed].36  
 So France was to be excluded from the very top table. Alphand, a key collaborator of Pleven 
on economic matters for the Free French, had warned about this well before 1944. Another French 
diplomat in exile having been stranded at the French Embassy at Washington in May 1940, he was 
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made Free French national commissioner for the Economy, Finance, and the Colonies and director of 
Economic Affairs in Algiers by De Gaulle in 1941 and was his main economic advisor until 1944. 
Alphand pointed out to De Gaulle in mid-1942 that the problem with economic negotiations about 
Europe after the war hinged on two essentials – “the supplying [ravitaillement] of Europe and 
economic re-organisation”. These were not just technical problems but provided precedents for a 
more general system that the Allies would have to develop. But they were being discussed “par des 
organismes exclusivement inter-Américains et en dehors des Alliés” [without wider Allied 
participation]. This course was extremely dangerous for the future of French economic independence.  
Alphand also feared that the Americans would “with that economic mentality which is their key 
characteristic [qui les characterise] interpret European problems as too narrowly economic and too 
narrowly American, as happened after 1919”. Mechanisms must therefore be set up “with the British” 
to stop a repeat of the “lack of harmonisation of economic and political interests” that had happened 
after the First World War.  So France had to participate in the big conferences that were to come, and 
he felt the Free French must take the lead.37 
 The fear of exclusion was not only about financial discussions, it was about being taken 
seriously as a state and having French views taken seriously about what any international organisation  
should look like. The French elites were well aware that the new “League of Nations” would have to 
be sensitive to American feelings and prejudices. Just after Dumbarton Oaks, Cot suggested that the 
French had to put their views with “le realisme et la souplesse” [realism and flexibility].38 Massigli 
had been deeply marked, even scarred, by the results of American isolationism after the Great War, 
and by his frustrating battles within the League of Nations against France’s “Allies” in the 1930s.  
Terrified of another withdrawal by “Les Puissances Anglo-Saxonnes”, he was now convinced that 
the war would have an extremely violent aftermath, possibly including a collapse of one of the victor 
Powers in the same fashion as Italy after 1919. The only answers to these possibilities were to make 
15 
 
sure that history did not repeat itself, which made a real agreement with the Powers essential. It also 
meant they had to get to the basis of what caused war: economic, social and political. 
 Massigli was very impressed by the French writer’s, Elie Halévy’s, view that political and 
economic factors both caused wars and that economics could contribute their solution.39 But this 
would only be achieved by a pooling of global resources – “vast plans must be put into operation . . . 
the realisation of a real community between states”. This had to be done by new organisations to 
create “a concrete and humane economics [une économie concrète, une économie humaine]”. Quoting 
the philosopher, Henri Bergson, in his support, this had to be a “satisfaction of essential human needs 
. . . a return to simplicity”.40  
 As to the nature of the UN, it could not be like the League, a “closed society”, but rather one 
that could have effective sanction powers, as France had wanted in 1919 but been denied by the other 
Allies. The new organisation had to be based on “égalité” between states, people, and groups, and 
“liberté” as much as possible economically. In a subsequent analysis, he bemoaned that France was 
not at present an equal “partner” and that the two Great Powers who led the “game” [jeu], were the 
United States and Soviet Union, which had radically different views of the future of Europe, 
differences which could rip it apart “à la remorque de l’un et de l’autre”. As for the European states, 
the United States was now convinced that the war had been caused by the leaving of one Power in 
charge in Europe as after 1919, France, and that this must never happen again.  So “The United States 
was preparing to treat the European states as clients, not as equals” [en clients, non en égaux]. These 
were views, stressed at the beginning of this analysis, widely held, a reflection on the diminishing 
influence of France, and indeed Europe, on “Western civilisation”.   
 Britain was different, as it had fought and played an important role in the war from the outset; 
however, thought Massigli, fundamentally “British problems are like ours [analogues aux nôtres]”. 
France must do its utmost to co-ordinate efforts with the British as a consequence, as well as look to 
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a security alliance with them and the Benelux countries to protect the northeast of France.41 In 1943 
and 1944, much more thought was put into what became in effect the notion of European Union, 
except to note that both Massigli and De Gaulle were much more concerned with local European 
security than what they saw as the vague generalities of the League. A senior Free French advisor, 
Jean Monnet, was to emerge in this debate as a key advocate of a Europe that included all European 
states, including the Soviet Union. His formulation importantly was for “a European organisation 
which includes Germany but changes it completely” [la change fondamentalement].42  
 So the Dumbarton Oaks conference, which was to plan a successor to the League, might be 
seen as a second-order priority in 1943 and 1944. After all, Europe was where the fighting was to 
take place to liberate France. That was partly a mistaken impression: Massigli and De Gaulle got very 
interested once the first UN agency established before Dumbarton Oaks, UNRRA, started to emerge 
and began operations, run by Roosevelt’s political friend, Lehman. The Free French were keen to be 
consulted about what role UNRRA would play in Europe after the hoped for liberation, about which 
they became more and more nervous as the prospect of D-Day approached. After the liberation, the 
French were very ambivalent about ceding any of their sovereignty to Lehman in spite of a huge 
American army and air force backing him. The “restoration” or “reconstruction” of France certainly 
had to be done in co-operation with the Anglo-Americans, but not only by them.43  
 Right up to and including June 1944, the Free French were wary that Roosevelt in particular 
was using every ruse possible to avoid including them in serious planning of a future global order. 
As Alphand put it in mid-June 1944, “as I have always believed, the key to the problem remains the 
White House . . . the attitude of the President does not seem to have varied”. He had great hopes that 
De Gaulle’s first visit to Bayeux in Normandy after the liberation would do something to change 
Roosevelt’s attitude.44  
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 Alphand, Massigli, and De Gaulle worried that they were not only being excluded from these 
international organisation discussions but also from the EAC; chaired by the American ambassador 
at London, John Winant, it first met in January 1944 to decide on the wider implications of the 
liberation of Europe.  Composed of the Big Three, the EAC did not include France or the other Allied 
governments, and they were merely asked for their “opinions”. A later comment in August 1944 by 
Massigli recorded that the now retired Welles had stated in his recent book that he “did not consider 
France as being a key member of the permanent council [directoire permanent] of the Powers”. Even 
though France, by now led by the GPRF, was invited onto the EAC not long afterwards – on 27 
August – the issue added to those that irritated the French hierarchy.45  
 But it was still a divided hierarchy. There were other sections within the Free French that were 
interested in what kind of Europe and global international organisations might emerge from the ruins 
of the League and the war. Somewhat in opposition to De Gaulle’s “capital” in Algiers, the London- 
based Free French, which met in a loose grouping called the “Groupe Jean Jaurès”, often felt that De 
Gaulle excluded them from decision-making, something that galled them as many of their number 
were directly involved in Resistance activities. Indeed many of their number had been killed or 
captured by the Gestapo. They were also as unimpressed as Auriol, who attended their meetings on 
occasion, about the lack of “internationalist spirit” of British Labour Party officials who were their 
main contacts with the Churchill’s government. But many of the “Groupe” were also unimpressed by 
De Gaulle, accused at one point in 1941 of having systematically gotten rid of men of the left and 
replacing them with those of the right. Although such feelings started to dissipate by the end of 1941, 
they were never entirely absent, leaving this key body distrustful of both the British and their French 
compatriots. Their discussions on occasion ended up in fisticuffs, such was the passion involved, 
understandable as many of their discussions were about the dreadful conditions that existed on the 
ground in France.46  
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 The place given to France by the Big Three in the up-coming decisions on the future of Europe 
and the UN were to prove the key tests of how much the United States in particular really took France 
seriously. Giving France a token seat at the table of power in the EAC in August 1944 and the 
recognition of the GPRF was one small step in this direction, even though everyone knew that real 
decisions had so far been taken by the Big Three in private. But it did mean that De Gaulle and other 
French opinions were at least now being heard. They had also gained the ear of top officials of the 
Labour Party, as when William Gillies, international secretary of the Party, Philip Noel Baker, a junior 
Foreign Office minster and prominent Party intellectual, and Hugh Dalton, the president of the Board 
of Trade, attended the first Socialist Party Congress in Paris after the Liberation in November 1944. 
Auriol, whose complaint of July forms the title of this analysis, was not much relieved by this 
presence. The “International Conference of London” of European Socialist parties in March 1945 
later recorded their approval of the UN structure: the Security Council, General Assembly, and 
Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC]. Interestingly, what they did not like was either the 
“equality of states” or a “hierarchy corresponding to the real importance of states”, the latter a 
principle that would not have worked in France’s favour in 1944.47 
 The French leadership wanted there to be much more clarification of the new-fangled UN 
proposal that was to become the Security Council. Concerns about this body occur consistently in the 
diplomatic record in late 1944 and until the San Francisco Conference in June 1945. De Gaulle 
remained as president of the GPRF until 2 January 1946 and, whilst in this post, relations with the 
United States were to remain frosty at best. As he had with Hoppenot, Roosevelt tried his best to 
continue the charm offensive with Hoppenot’s very heavyweight successor, Henri Bonnet.  When 
first meeting Bonnet in January 1945, Roosevelt told him of his admiration for De Gaulle “dans les 
termes les plus sympathiques” and that Franco-American relations were “faites de confiance et 
d’amitié”. He wanted to arm ten French divisions for the final stages of the war. Most significantly, 
19 
 
he claimed that he wished to give “France a place in the future international organisation deserved by 
its traditions, ideals and importance”.48 
 But France was put in its place in the “hierarchy” in quite a brutal fashion not much later in 
the war, and this showed the Franco-American wounds were as wide as ever. The new French foreign 
minister, Georges Bidault, had met with Roosevelt’s closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, in late January 
1945 in Paris and been assured that De Gaulle should have been invited to the next Big Three meeting 
at Yalta in early February. Roosevelt “desperately [vivement]” wanted to meet De Gaulle as soon as 
possible: “No European settlement would be worthwhile [valable] without the agreement of France”. 
But unfortunately, chipped in Jefferson Caffery, the American ambassador at Paris, French attendance 
would not be possible before Yalta. There followed a series of exchanges on the future of Germany 
and the French colonies, the most important issues for France that revealed that Roosevelt had no 
sympathy for French demands. France could not be given any “exclusive” role in the Rhineland as 
after 1919, but France would be given an “equal role” in a “quadri-partite . . . provisional organ” 
[organe provisoire] to oversee the area. As for colonies, Hopkins had already discussed this with 
Pleven in Washington and undiplomatically told him that Roosevelt’s view was that “colonies were 
a smokescreen [un simple décor] for the exploitation of the native populations by Western 
businessmen”. Hopkins had not been impressed when Pleven had countered that nowhere in the 
French Empire was there the same “segregation vis-à-vis coloured populations” that was seen in the 
United States.49  Unsurprisingly, when De Gaulle met Hopkins the next day, their opening gambits 
were for Hopkins to say he wished to “gloss over the details and get to the heart of things: the 
existence of a malaise in relations between Paris and Washington”.  Always a man of few words, De 
Gaulle replied “en effet” [“indeed”].  
 The rest of the period until the San Francisco Conference was a master class in Gaullist 
petulance and brinkmanship countered by American icy forbearance. The French set up a 
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“Commission” at the end of 1944 to come up with ideas for the conference, with a star-studded roster 
of politicians and even historians like Pierre Renouvin. The Conference, they decided, should be 
based on the same noble ideas that had underpinned the French delegation in 1919, and especially the 
thinking of Bourgeois, whose ideas that the League should have had proper “teeth” had now been 
triumphantly confirmed by the setting up of the Security Council and talk of a UN army. It showed 
the “slow progress [progrès tardif] of the Anglo-Saxon countries in this matter”. It was Bourgeois 
whom Cecil had said was “rather feeble physically and cannot see very much” and makes speeches 
of “interminable length”.50 The Commission was therefore in effect a declaration of independent 
intent, for the American government had set its sights firmly against any repetition of the mistakes of 
1919.  
 But a second declaration of independence then followed when the French delegation for San 
Francisco was formed in April 1945. It had some overlap in its membership with the Commission 
and some very significant additions. Pleven was now included for ECOSOC issues, as was Monnet, 
well known and respected in Washington on economic matters. The initial reflections in Paris on how 
to play the conference game were that France went to it with few allies. Most of France’s pre-war 
partners in the Eastern European Petite Entente were now either Axis states or under the thumb of the 
Soviet Union. Neutrals had not been invited, which excluded Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and 
Ireland, all much more likely to be sympathetic to France than to the United States. So how could 
France “affirm itself as a Great Power”, and how could it “maintain its liberty of action”? 51  
 In the build-up to San Francisco, the French were still being excluded with the State 
Department servicing the Yalta Conference at the same time as it planned the future of the UN. Even 
after Yalta, the French Embassy at Washington was being told that there was no certainty that France 
would be invited to any more Big Three meetings, which would involve issues of prime French 
interest like the future of Poland, UN Trusteeship, and Germany. Then during the Yalta discussions, 
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the United States government suggested to Massigli, now French ambassador at London, that France 
and China could join the Big Three in sending out the invitations to San Francisco as “equals”. De 
Gaulle and his officials replied it would only do this if it was allowed to add that France had had no 
part in the Dumbarton Oaks discussions and that it had numerous amendments to propose. The Big 
Three, particularly Stalin, took extreme umbrage and told De Gaulle through Henri Bonnet that he 
had 48 hours to agree with the proposal or the invitation would be rescinded. To cut a very long story 
short, the French refused, in spite of several more extensions of the deadline, and did not send out the 
invitations.52 France did nonetheless attend the San Francisco Conference, was granted permanent 
seat on the Security Council, and played a constructive role there. France had maybe proved its “Great 
Power” status and “liberty of action”, for only Great Powers could say no to the Big Three. But the 
exclusion from participation in Yalta, “manifestly signifying their lost status”, also fostered a feeling 
in Paris that the French were now subject to a “keenly disliked Anglo-American and then a United 
States-Soviet hegemony”.53  
This “liberty of action” was of course an illusion. When the franc was devalued at the end of 
1945, all the American secretary of the Treasury, Fred Vinson, could offer was United States 
“sympathy” that “a change in the franc rate was an essential step in the French program of economic 
reconstruction”; and the British Treasury thought a drop from the then current 200 francs to the dollar 
to 400 or 480 was necessary, with the Americans probably holding out for more than 500.54 Non-
consultation over the UN at Dumbarton Oaks was thus to prove the first of a long series of further 
humiliations for France that continued after the end of the war. Perhaps the closest parallel would be 
to see France in the situation of Greece and the United States as Germany in the European financial 
crises after 2008. Such economic behaviour may have made absolute sense, but it greatly contributed 
to a feeling of diminished sovereignty in France.  
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 So the patterns of the war years were largely continued into the peace. Although the French 
attended the San Francisco Conference and were granted equal status with the other Great Powers in 
the Security Council, the rest of the period until at least 1950 is a history of mainly small humiliations 
for the various French governments both during De Gaulle’s final year in office – until January 1946 
– and after. The implementation of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and a host of other major 
developments were not much influenced by French feelings, positive or negative. The British 
governments of the period, and of course British politicians like Churchill and Ernst Bevin, the 
Labour foreign secretary after July 1945, were perceived in Paris has having the ear of Washington, 
which made the French feel more embittered and alienated. This perception constituted, of course, 
somewhat of an illusion – Britain’s parlous economic state after 1945 meant it needed its “American 
uncle” just as much as France needed its “oncle d’Amerique”. It was not really until after Bidault left 
office as foreign minister in 1948 that the tide turned and Washington really engaged in policies, 
notably on Germany and Europe, with which the French could agree. Those are beyond the scope of 
this exegesis. 
   So a last thought might be as to why the Americans were so tough with the French? Partly it 
was because of the aforementioned feeling in Washington circles that the French leadership, and De 
Gaulle in particular, were not trustworthy, or maybe not even the basis a possible viable future 
government. Partly it was because the United States government was aware that Americans would 
not welcome it propping up yet another series of useless French politicians. This course had after all 
culminated in American armed forces having to be sent to Europe for a second time. But equally, the 
British and French had not forgotten their own nightmare scenario, a repeat of the American 
withdrawal from European affairs of the 1920s. The trauma of the 1920s and 1930s were not easily 
forgotten on either side of the Atlantic. 
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 As mentioned above, Pleven went personally to the San Francisco Conference to find out what 
the Americans now thought of France and the future in general. He decided the main American fears 
were of unemployment after the war – as had happened the last time – and a fear that they would not 
have access to primary commodities [matières premières], as well as a natural fear of what might still 
happen in China and Japan. Pleven also asked White what were his main personal fears about France. 
Again, the 1920s were evoked by White: Would France rearm instead of reconstruct? Could France 
modernise its production? Given Pleven’s role in the hapless French aircraft industry in 1939, this 
must have struck home. It might even be asked whether Pleven’s different perception of the United 
States after spending the war years there made for his subsequent breach with De Gaulle in the 1950s. 
The wartime experiences of the two men were very different, and they formed separate parties in 
France that pursued very different policies. 
 But whereas Pleven understood that France could no longer ask for what it had taken as its 
birth right in 1919, De Gaulle did not. France needed the United States in quite basic ways. The 
French now had only 6 kilograms of sugar annually per person on which to live – opposed to 23 
kilograms in 1939 – and only 250 grams of meat a week – instead of the 1939 figure of 3 kilograms.55 
The United States was to prove adept at forcing the French into compromises that would have been 
impossible 25 years previously. The above- mentioned diktat about the French franc was thus merely 
the harbinger of some “rough wooing” of France by America, economic statecraft at its most brutal. 
France now did matter, but it had to behave itself. 
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